Post World War II European welfare states experienced several decades of relatively low unemployment, followed by a plague of persistently high unemployment since the 1980's. We impute the higher unemployment t o w elfare states' diminished ability to cope with more turbulent economic times, such as the ongoing restructuring from manufacturing to the service industry, adoption of new information technologies and a rapidly changing international economy. W e use a general equilibrium search model where workers accumulate skills on the job and lose skills during unemployment.
Introduction
During their rst decades, European welfare states exhibited unemployment rates equal to or less than those of other market economies; but in the 1980's, they su ered large increases in unemployment, which h a v e endured. Figure 1 shows that unemployment in European OECD countries has from 1983 persistently exceeded the OECD average by around two percentage points. Higher occurrences of long term unemployment h a v e accompanied higher levels of unemployment. According to Table 1 , more than half of all European unemployment in 1989 was classi ed as long-term unemployment with a duration o f a y ear and over, up from less than a third of unemployment in 1979.
1 Table 1 shows that the increasing incidence of long-term unemployment is common to the European OECD countries.
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In contrast, the United States escaped such a persistent increase in unemployment, and U.S. long-term unemployment has remained low. 1 Sin eld 1968 provides a longer historical perspective on long-term unemployment in Europe. He studied it during the 1960's when, except for Belgium, it was not considered a major problem. De ning`long-term' as six months and over, Sin eld concluded that long-term unemployment typically a ected half a percent of a country's labor force. In countries such as former West Germany and the Scandinavian countries, it was less than two tenths of a percent.
A glaring exception in Table 1 to the European unemployment dilemma in the 1980's is Sweden. Ljungqvist and Sargent 1995b provide an explanation of the Swedish unemployment experience including the current crisis with more than 13 per cent of the labor force either unemployed or engaged in labor market programs. Table 24 . g Except for year 1995, data refer to former West Germany only.
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Various theories have been proposed to explain the rise in European unemployment. Blanchard and Summers 1986 and Lindbeck and Snower 1988 impute the outcome to insider-outsider" con icts between employed and unemployed workers that arose in the highly unionized economies of Europe. Bentolila and Bertola 1990 study the idea that excessive European hiring and ring costs contributed to higher unemployment. Malinvaud 1994 emphasizes a capital shortage in Europe caused by high real wages in the 1970's and high real interest rates in the 1980's. All these explanations assign the problem to the demand for labor, making the decisions either of employers or of unionized employed workers sustain a high unemployment rate. In contrast, we focus on the e ects of the welfare state on the supply of labor. It is well known that high income taxation and generous welfare bene ts distort workers' labor supply decisions. We hope to contribute a sense of how the welfare state adversely a ects the dynamic responses to economic shocks and to increasing turbulence in the economic environment. 3 One reason for the past lack of emphasis on workers' distorted incentives as an explanation for high European unemployment m ust be the scarce empirical support for the idea. As pointed out by OECD 1994a, chapter 8, most earlier empirical studies have failed to nd any cross-country correlation between unemployment bene ts and aggregate unemployment. In fact, there was even a negative correlation between bene t levels and unemployment in the 1960's and early 1970's. A common conclusion has therefore been that generous entitlement programs are not to be blamed for high unemployment rates. However, the same OECD study presents an opposing view and interprets the time-series evidence as indicating that unemployment rates do respond to bene t entitlements, but with a considerable lag of 5 to 10 years, and in some cases 10 to 20 years. A natural question then becomes, why are there such lags between rises in bene ts and later sharp rises in unemployment? Our analysis suggests that the lags are purely coincidental, and that the real explanation for persistently higher European unemployment from the 1980's is to be found in a changed economic environment. Gottschalk and Mo tt 1994 have provided indirect evidence for the kind of change in the environment that drives our interpretation. For the two periods 1970-78 and 1979-87, they summarized U.S. earnings distributions in ways that led them to conclude that both the`permanent' and`transitory' components of the distributions had spread out from one subperiod to the next. In particular, using data from the Michigan Panel Study on Income Dynamics PSID, Gottschalk and Mo tt estimated for each subperiod the following decomposition of earnings y it for individual i in year t: y it = i + it , where i is an individual speci c mean, or`permanent' component of earnings, and it is a serially correlated`transitory' component of individual i's earnings. They compared the distributions of the i 's and the it 's for the two subperiods, and found the dispersion of both components to have increased. They and their discussants see Katz 1994 and Dickens 1994 interpreted these statistics in terms of how the increase in the dispersion of earnings observed during the 1980's in the U.S. was accompanied by an increase in the intertemporal volatility of an individual's earnings. Figures 2a and 2b reproduce Gottschalk and Mo tt's gures 2 and 4, respectively, which depict the increased dispersion of both the i distribution gure 2a and the unconditional it distribution gure 2b. The Gottschalk-Mo tt ndings would be expected if the economic environment had become more turbulent b e t w een the earlier and later subperiods. Likewise, many informal accounts assert that the economic environment has become more turbulent in the last couple of decades. The oil price shocks of the 1970's and reallocations from manufacturing to services have each put economic turbulence into the industrialized world. In addition, the spread of new information technologies, declines in government regulation, competition from newly industrialized countries, and increasing internationalization of the production, distribution, and marketing of goods and services are rapidly changing the economic environment. Harris 1993 argues that`globalization' has sped up in the last two decades and perhaps in the last decade in particular. We use Gottschalk and Mo tt's data description partly to inspire and partly to cross-check our model. Below, we show h o w increasing a key`turbulence' parameter in our model serves to push the earnings distribution in ways depicted by Gottschalk and Mo tt.
Our thesis is that changed economic conditions from the mid-1970's onward can explain the high long-term unemployment in the welfare states. We formulate a general equilibrium search model where workers' skills depreciate during unemployment spells, and unemployment bene ts are determined by w orkers' past earnings. Simulations of the model bring out the sensitivity of the equilibrium unemployment rate to the amounts of skills lost at lay o s. The analysis attributes the welfare states' persistently higher unemployment from the 1980's to increased turbulence in the economic environment, while also explaining how l o w er unemployment rates in the 1950's, the 1960's and the early 1970's were sustainable under more tranquil economic conditions.
Relative to our`tranquil times' setting, the 1980's turbulent times parameterization of our model exposes workers to the type of situation detected by Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993, who found that long-tenured displaced workers experienced large and of it across time.
Our analysis agrees with the basic conclusion in a recent OECD study and policy report 1994a,b that it is an inability of OECD economies and societies to adapt rapidly and innovatively to a world of rapid structural change that is the principal cause of high and persistent unemployment". But we believe that a greater emphasis should have been put on reforming bene t systems, instead of putting it last among policy recommendations. enduring earnings losses. In their Pennsylvania sample from the 1980's, a displaced worker experienced the following typical pattern: a sharp drop in earnings in the quarter a job was left, followed by a rapid recovery during next couple of years toward an eventual level of about 25 less than earned at the pre-displacement job. Figure 3 The unlucky workers in Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan's study su ered substantial capital losses, but by returning to work, they partly recovered their lost earnings. What would similarly unlucky workers have done if they had been exposed to European levels of unemployment compensation? Our model suggests that such long-tenured displaced workers in Europe are likely to end up among the numerous long-term unemployed in the prime-age and older worker category. T able 2 depicts the distribution of long-term unemployment across age categories. The OECD has computed the welfare bene ts available to the average 40-year-old worker with a long period of previous employment. Depending on family status, Table 3 shows net unemployment bene t replacement rates after tax and housing bene ts.
7
These generous bene ts should be compared to the substantial income losses of displaced workers in Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan's study. There are also other welfare programs in Europe, such as early retirement and disability insurance, which remove the assisted individuals from the labor force and the unemployment statistics. For example, totally disabled persons in the Netherlands in the 1980's were entitled to 70 80 prior to 1984 of last earned gross wage until the age of 65 after which they moved into the state pension system. At the end of 1990, disability bene ts were paid to 14 of the Dutch labor force and 80 of them were reported to be totally disabled. See OECD, 1992b. The next section extends our earlier model Ljungqvist and Sargent, 1995a by i n troducing a stochastic technology for skill accumulation and depreciation. Section 3 describes the calibration of the model. We compare the steady state for the welfare state to the laissez-faire outcome in Section 4. The two economies exhibit similar performance under tranquil economic conditions, when the loss of e ciency associated with the welfare state seems minimal. However, compared to the laissez-faire economy, the welfare state is much more vulnerable to economic shocks and turbulence. Section 5 traces out the impulse-response from an unexpected transient unemployment shock. The transient shock results in a prolonged period of long-term unemployment in the welfare state, whereas the recovery is almost immediate in the laissez-faire economy. 8 Section 6 demonstrates how persistent economic turbulence leads to higher steady state unemployment in the welfare state than in the laissez-faire economy. In Section 7, we generate arti cial earnings data from our model and compare them with the empirical patterns discerned by Gottschalk and Mo tt 1994, and Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan 1993. The nal section contains concluding comments.
The Economy
There is a continuum of workers with geometrically distributed life spans, indexed on the unit interval with births equaling deaths. An unemployed worker in period t chooses a search i n tensity s t 0 at a disutility cs t increasing in s t . Search m a y o r m a y not generate a wage o er in the next period. With probability s t , the unemployed worker receives one wage o er from the distribution F w = Probw t+1 w. With probability 1 , s t , the worker receives no o er in period t + 1 .W e assume s t 2 0; 1 , and that it is increasing in s t . Accepting a wage o er w t+1 means that the worker earns that wage per unit of skill for each period he is alive, not laid o , and has not quit his job.
The probability of being laid o at the beginning of a period is 2 0; 1. In addition, all workers are subjected to a probability o f 2 0; 1 of dying between periods.
Employed and unemployed workers experience stochastic accumulation or deterioration of skills. There is a nite number of skill levels with transition probabilities from skill level h to h 0 denoted by u h; h 0 and e h; h 0 for an unemployed and an employed worker, respectively. That is, an unemployed worker with skill level h faces a probability u h; h 0 that his skill level at the beginning of next period is h 0 , contingent on not dying. Similarly, e h; h 0 is the probability that an employed worker with skill level h sees his skill level 8 Pissarides 1992 analyzes loss of skills during unemployment in a matching model, where it is also true that a transient shock to unemployment can have persistent e ects. Firms are shown to create fewer jobs after the shock, since they are matching with workers of a lower average quality. Thus, this is another model of unemployment that is driven by the demand side for labor, while our paper focuses on the supply of labor in a welfare state. change to h 0 at the beginning of next period, contingent on not dying and not being laid o . In the event o f a l a y o , the transition probability is given by l h; h 0 . After this initial period of a lay o , the stochastic skill level of the unemployed worker is again governed by the transition probability u h; h 0 . All newborn workers begin with the lowest skill level.
A w orker observes his new skill level at the beginning of a period before deciding to accept a new wage o er, choose a search i n tensity, or quit a job. The objective o f each w orker is to maximize the expected value E t P 1 i=0 i 1 , i y t+i , where E t is the expectation operator conditioned on information at time t, is the subjective discount factor, and 1 , is the probability of surviving between two consecutive periods; y t+i is the worker's after-tax income from employment and unemployment compensation at time t + i net of disutility of searching and working.
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Workers who were laid o are entitled to unemployment compensation bene ts that are a function of their last earnings. Let bI be the unemployment compensation to an unemployed worker whose last earnings were I. Unemployment compensation is terminated if the worker turns down a job o er with earnings that are deemed to be`suitable' by the government in view of the worker's past earnings. Let I g I be the government determined suitable earnings' of an unemployed worker whose last earnings were I. Newborn workers and workers who have quit their previous job are not entitled to unemployment compensation. Both income from employment and unemployment compensation are subject to a at income tax of . The government policy functions bI and I g I and the tax parameter must be set so that income taxes cover the expenditures on unemployment compensation in an equilibrium.
Let V w;h be the value of the optimization problem for an employed worker with wage w and skill level h at the beginning of a period. The value associated with being unemployed and eligible for unemployment compensation bene ts is given by V b I;h, which is both a function of the unemployed worker's past earnings I and his current skill level h. In the case of an unemployed worker who is not entitled to unemployment compensation, 9 Our analysis focuses on how the welfare state a ects labor market incentives and e ciency in skill accumulation. We h a v e abstracted from the bene ts of risk sharing that government policies can provide when capital markets are incomplete. Adding such considerations would modify our results, but the forces at work in our analysis would remain. the corresponding value is denoted by V o h and depends only on the worker's current skill level. The Bellman equations can then be written as follows. Associated with the solution of equations 1 3 are two functions, s b I;h and w b I;h, giving an optimal search i n tensity and a reservation wage of an unemployed worker with last earnings I and current skill level h, who is eligible for unemployment compensation bene ts; and two functions, s o h and w o h, giving an optimal search i n tensity and a reservation wage of an unemployed worker with skill level h, who is not entitled to unemployment compensation. The reservation wage of an employed worker will be the same as for an unemployed worker without bene ts, w o h, since anyone who quits his job is not eligible for unemployment compensation.
We will study stationary equilibria, or steady states, for our economy. A steady state is de ned in a standard way, as a set of government policy parameters, optimal policies s o h; w o h; s b I;h; w b I;h and associated time invariant employment and unemployment distributions and total unemployment compensation payments that satisfy workers' optimality conditions and the government's budget constraint. We compute a steady state as a xed point in the tax rate . F or a xed tax rate , w e solve w orkers' optimization problem and use the implied search i n tensities and reservation wages to deduce stationary employment and unemployment distributions, and unemployment compensation. A balanced government budget de nes a xed point i n , which is associated with a stationary equilibrium.
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After having found a stationary equilibrium, we compute various quantities such as GNP per capita, average productivity of employed workers, average skill level, average duration of unemployment, and measures of long-term unemployment.
Calibration
We set the model period to be two w eeks. We set the discount factor = 0 : 9985, making the annual interest rate 4.0 percent. The probabilities of dying and being laid o are = 0 : 0009, and = 0 : 009, respectively. The working life of an individual is then geometrically distributed with an expected duration of 42.7 years. Similarly, the average time before being laid o given that the worker has not quit or died is 4.3 years.
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There are 21 di erent skill levels evenly partitioning the interval 1; 2 . All newborn workers start out with the lowest skill level equal to one. After each period of employment that is not followed by a l a y o , with a probability of 0.1 the worker's skills increase by one level 0.05 units of skills, and with probability .9 they remain unchanged. Employed workers who have reached the highest skill level retain those skills until becoming unemployed. As a point of reference, someone who starts out working with the lowest skill level 10 The iterative procedure picks the lowest possible consistent with a stationary equilibrium. We c hoose to focus on this the least distortionary tax rate and ignore any higher tax rates that might be consistent with other steady states. For example, there will always exist another stationary equilibrium with a 100 tax rate where all economic activities are closed down.
will on average reach the highest skill level after seven years and eight months, conditional upon no job loss. The stochastic depreciation of skills during unemployment i s t wice as fast as the accumulation of skills. That is, after each period of unemployment, there is a probability of 0.2 that the worker's skills decrease by one level; otherwise they remain unchanged. The lowest skill level reached through depreciation is also an absorbing state until the unemployed worker gains employment. Upon being laid o in a period, the worker retains his skill level from the latest period of employment.
The disutility from searching and the function mapping search i n tensities into probabilities of obtaining a wage o er are assumed to be The exogenous wage o er distribution is assumed to be a normal distribution with a mean of 0.5 and a variance of 0.1 that has been truncated to the unit interval and then normalized to integrate to one. Since a worker's earnings are the product of his wage and his current skill level, it follows that observed earnings fall in the interval 0; 2 . For purposes of awarding unemployment compensation, the government divides the earnings interval 0; 2 evenly into 15 earnings classes; let the upper limits of these classes be denoted W i , for i = 1 ; 2 ; :::; 15. A laid o worker with last earnings belonging to earnings class i receives an unemployment compensation of 0:7W i in each period of unemployment. However, the bene t is terminated if the worker does not accept a job o er associated with earnings greater than or equal to 0:7W i . That is, a laid o worker faces both a`replacement ratio' and`suitable earnings' criterion equal to 70 of the upper limit of the earnings class containing his own last earnings before being laid o . New workers and quitters are not entitled to unemployment compensation.
The following numerical simulations will make it clear that there are two k ey parameters driving our analysis; the fact that unemployment compensation is a function of past earnings 70 replacement ratio, and the amount of immediate loss in human capital that a job loss imposes zero in this initial parameterization of`tranquil times'. Perturbations in the latter parameter will be used to capture the notion of`economic turbulence'. Our qualitative ndings are fairly robust to changes in other parameters. For example, similar results were obtained in earlier simulations where we had doubled both the range of skills and the transition probabilities of gaining a skill level when remaining employed for two periods and of losing a skill level when being unemployed for two consecutive periods.
Economic Forces at Work
Given the calibration above, the tax rate that balances the government budget is = 0:0285. To shed light on the workings of this welfare state WS, we will now contrast its steady state to that of a laissez-faire economy LF, in which there is no government intervention whatsoever. y GNP and average productivity are computed for the 2-week period. z The discounted stream of consumption is net of disutility o f searching and working. Table 4 shows that the two economies have v ery similar steady states. Both their pro-duction and average skill levels are indistinguishable, and the unemployment rate is less than seven tenths of a percentage point higher in the WS economy. A s a w elfare measure, the discounted expected net consumption stream of a newborn worker di ers by only four weeks of per capita GNP two 2-week periods. We conclude that the e ciency costs associated with the welfare system are relatively small. However, behind these numbers lurk important di erences in unemployment dynamics. It is true that the average unemployment spell is very similar across the two economies: 13.3 weeks in the WS economy as compared to 11.8 weeks in the LF economy. But the WS economy has more dispersion in the duration of unemployment spells, as indicated by the fractions of long-term unemployed at any point in time. The percentage of currently unemployed workers with spells to date greater than or equal to 6 months 12 months is 12.6 1.3 in the WS economy as compared to 9.8 0.7 in the LF economy. We compare the WS economy and the LF economy b y rst looking at unemployed workers' behavior in terms of reservation wages and search i n tensities. The reservation wages in the WS economy of unemployed workers receiving unemployment bene ts are depicted in Figure 4 . The reservation wages are graphed as a function of the unemployed workers' current skills and their last earnings before being laid o . Not surprisingly, the reservation wage is a positive function of last earnings, which determine the level of unemployment compensation. For example, the reservation wage of someone with the lowest skill level of one, but with the highest possible last earnings, is 0.93. This corresponds to a w orker who once had attained a high skill level while making a wage at the top of the wage distribution. If such a w orker with a high unemployment bene t happens to lose all his skills due to a prolonged period of unemployment, he will be extremely picky in terms of the wage o ers he will accept. That is, before giving up his generous bene ts, he wants to nd a very good wage o er to compensate for his skill loss. Since such high wage o ers are hard to nd, this worker will also be unwilling to expend too much energy in searching for a new job. As can be seen in Figure 5 , the optimal search i n tensity of such a w orker is a mere 0.06. Figure 5 shows also how the search i n tensity i s l o w er for unemployed workers with both high bene ts and high current skills that have not yet deteriorated due to unemployment. The 70 replacement ratio causes these workers to consume some leisure" by reducing their search i n tensity. Unemployed workers without bene ts in the WS economy and the unemployed in the LF economy prefer to choose the maximum search i n tensity of one. Their reservation wages can be found in Figure 6 . Contrasting Figure 6 to Figure 4 for the WS economy, the reservation wage of an unemployed worker without bene ts is always less than or equal to the reservation wage of an unemployed worker with bene ts, for any given skill level. Unemployment spells are of course more costly to the unemployed without unemployment compensation. Across the WS and the LF economies, there is a slight tendency for higher reservation wages in the WS economy. An unemployed worker without bene ts in the WS economy takes into account the future potential bene ts from the unemployment compensation program. It is important for the worker to become vested at a high wage rate in the event of being laid o . The U-shaped pattern for reservations wages in Figure 6 emerges from the depreciation and accumulation of skills. On the one hand, at the lower end of the skill spectrum, unemployed workers have less to lose in terms of skills from an extended period of unemployment. They therefore tend to choose higher reservation wages as compared to unemployed workers with skills in the intermediate range. On the other hand, at the upper end of the skill spectrum, the potential for further skill accumulation becomes smaller and the emphasis shifts towards the search for higher wages, i.e., the reservation wage curve starts to slope upward.
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The e ects of di erent search behavior in the LF economy and the WS economy are illustrated in Figure 7 . The gure follows a cohort of workers who lost their jobs after having reached the highest skill level. At di erent lengths of the unemployment spell, the curves show the fraction of still unemployed workers who gain employment in the current 2-week period `hazard rate'. The dashed curve pertains to the LF economy without any unemployment compensation bene ts. Since all unemployed workers in the LF economy choose the highest search i n tensity, the shape of the curve is solely determined by h o w reservation wages vary with skill levels. Recall from Figure 6 that reservation wages must initially be decreasing when skills start depreciating from the maximum level. That is, over time, unemployed workers become more and more concerned about additional losses of skills. Their willingness successively to reduce their reservation wages explains the rising hazard of gaining employment during the rst couple of years of unemployment.
After three years, the remaining unemployed have lost enough of their skills that further losses are less of a concern to them. Their increasing reservation wage policy in Figure 6 translates into a falling hazard of gaining employment in Figure 7 . The hazard of gaining employment i n a n y given 2-week period levels out at 15.8 in the LF economy. The curves show the fraction of still unemployed workers who gain employment i n a n y given 2-week period after the lay o . The dashed line pertains to the LF economy; the solid and dotted lines refer to the WS economy with the workers' last earnings belonging to the third highest earnings class and the highest earnings class, respectively.
The solid line in Figure 7 traces the corresponding hazard of gaining employment for a cohort of workers who become unemployed at the highest skill level in the WS economy with their last earnings in the third highest earnings class. This group of workers is the most numerous one in a steady state, comprising roughly 30 of all employed workers. Over the rst two y ears, the hazard of gaining employment is quite similar to that in the LF economy, but thereafter diverges considerably. A long-term unemployed worker in the WS economy becomes disillusioned, and his prospect of nding a job seems less attractive o v er time as compared just to living on his unemployment compensation bene ts. As a result, the worker is both raising his reservation wage and reducing his search i n tensity, as earlier shown in Figures 4 and 5 . The hazard of gaining employment nally settles down to 4.5 , which i s m uch smaller than the 15.8 in the LF economy. The third dotted line in Figure 7 shows the hazard of gaining employment if the cohort of laid o workers had last earnings in the highest earnings class. With these even more generous unemployment bene ts, the hazard function is naturally lower, and it converges to a low of 1.7 . Fortunately, these potential incentive problems have only a small impact on the steady state of the WS economy, as earlier shown in Table 4 . Loosely speaking, the incentive problems are minor thanks to the relatively low a v erage duration of unemployment.
A Transient Economic Shock
The unemployment dynamics described in the previous section make the WS economy more vulnerable to economic shocks. This section demonstrates how a transient shock can cause a prolonged period of long-term unemployment in the WS economy while the LF economy is more resilient. Speci cally, w e will trace out both economies' responses to an unexpected transient unemployment shock. We assume that once and for all, the normal lay o rate of 0.009 rises 20-fold to 0.18 in a single 2-week period at time 0 in the following gures. Also, everyone who becomes unemployed in this particular period immediately loses all of his accumulated skills. After this one-period shock, both economies once again experience the normal lay o rate and rates of skill depreciation and accumulation. All policy parameters such as taxes and the unemployment compensation program are kept constant throughout the experiment, which means that the workers' decision rules stay the same over time, and that the economies will eventually return to their steady states. During the transition, additional government expenditures on unemployment compensation in the WS economy are assumed to be nanced by levying lump-sum taxes. As can be seen in Figure 8 , the unemployment rates in both economies jump up initially by roughly 16 percentage points. However, the unemployment rates take v ery di erent paths thereafter. In the LF economy, the high unemployment rate dies out quickly because the unemployed workers`bite the bullet' and search i n tensively for less well-paying jobs as compared to their lost earnings. In contrast, the WS economy is plagued by a prolonged period of unemployment since the unemployed workers with their depreciated skills have di culty nding jobs that they prefer to their unemployment compensation based on past earnings. Besides their higher reservation wages, these workers also reduce search intensities to balance the small prospective gains from search against the utility costs associated with search. The drawn out unemployment response in the WS economy is naturally associated with longer unemployment spells. Figures 9.a and 9 .b show h o w long-term unemployment gradually emerges after the shock. At a n y point in time, the gures decompose unemployment i n to the fraction of unemployed workers who have to date been unemployed for at least one year below the dashed line, those who have so far su ered unemployment of less than a year but at least 6 months between the solid line and the dashed line, and those who have u n til now been unemployed for less than 6 months above the solid line. Not surprisingly, both of the rst two measures of unemployment fall at the time of the shock, since there is a ood of newly laid o workers into unemployment. The two measures then rise predictably after 6 months and 12 months, respectively. The problem of long-term unemployment in the WS economy shows up starkly in Figure 9 .a. At the peaks of the two long-term unemployment measures, there is rst a fraction of 66.6 of all unemployed workers being unemployed for at least half a year, and later 49.5 of all unemployed have to date experienced unemployment f o r a y ear or more. In contrast, the corresponding numbers for the LF economy in Figure 9 .b are 33.3 and 4.2 , respectively. Besides the lower incidence of long-term unemployment, the LF economy shows hardly any persistence in the fractions of long-term unemployed as compared to the WS economy.
The exogenous jump in the lay o rate and the accompanying depreciation of workers' skills a ect the economies' GNP adversely. Figure 10 shows a sharp drop of around 17 in GNP. The faster recovery in the LF economy as compared to the WS economy is due to the fact that its labor force is returning to work more quickly. A conceivably misleading measurement of the economies' performances is the change in average productivity o f e mployed workers. At the end of the rst year, Figure 11 shows that the average productivity in the WS economy falls by 4.7 while the decline in the LF economy is signi cantly larger at 7.2 . The explanation for this di erence is that laid o workers with depreciated skills return to employment m uch faster in the LF economy, while they are slowly phased in to the WS economy. The long-term unemployment in the WS economy is in this way concealing the severity of the exogenous shock t o w orkers' skills. Finally, the budgetary impact of the shock on the WS government is displayed in Figure 12 . The de cit nanced with lump-sum taxation reaches a high of 12.5 as a share of steady state GNP, and is persistent due to the economy's unemployment problems. 
Persistent Economic Turbulence
The previous section indicated that the welfare state is prone to experience enduring periods of long-term unemployment after transient economic shocks. This section demonstrates how persistent economic turbulence increases the unemployment rate in welfare states. Speci cally, w e compute and compare the steady states for di erent economic environments with more or less economic turbulence. Economic turbulence is de ned in terms of the mean and variance of skill losses associated with lay o s. We n o w let the skills of a newly laid o worker be distributed according to the left half of a normal distribution with the range starting at the lowest possible skill level and ending at the worker's skill level before the lay o . During the unemployment spell itself and at times of continuing employment, skill depreciation and accumulation are governed by the same transition probabilities as before.
With this de nition of economic turbulence, the earlier steady state serves as a benchmark case with zero variance. Recall that our earlier assumption was that a newly laid o worker kept his skill level from last period of employment. Let us now consider three alternative e n vironments with di erent probability distributions for skills of newly laid o workers, as depicted in Figure 13 . The graph is drawn for a worker who had attained the highest skill level of 2 before being laid o . The same distributions apply to a worker with another skill level so long as we rescale the range so that it ends at that particular worker's skill level before the lay o . The exact distributions in Figure 13 are obtained by taking the left side of a normal distribution that is con ned to and centered on the unit interval. The solid, dotted, and dashed lines correspond to variances of :02, :03, and :04, respectively. The left halves of these distributions are then normalized to integrate to one. Finally, since there is a discrete number of skill levels in the model, the distributions in Figure 13 are transformed into step functions for each kind of laid o worker. Table 5 reports the steady states for the WS economy and the LF economy when assuming alternative degrees of economic turbulence. The unemployment response to increased economic turbulence is strikingly di erent in the two economies. The steady states in the LF economy are associated with a slightly lower unemployment rate when economic turbulence increases. The primary explanation for this is that the greater loss of skills among laid o workers, who have t ypically accumulated the highest level of skills before the lay o , causes more unemployed workers to end up in the middle skill range where reservation wages are the lowest as indicated in Figure 6 . In contrast, the unemployment rate in the WS economy rises sharply in response to increased economic turbulence. The explanation for this is two-fold. First, larger numbers of unemployed workers nd themselves with considerable losses of skills while being entitled to generous unemployment compensation bene ts. That is, the incentive problems identi ed earlier by Figure 7 now a ect a larger group of unemployed. Second, the larger uncertainties associated with skill accumulation and increased taxes make i t e v en less attractive for an unemployed worker to look for and accept a job, especially if he is currently receiving generous unemployment compensation. As a result, these unemployed workers choose to lower their search i n tensities and raise their reservation wages. This exacerbates the economy's unemployment problem. Table 5 shows also that a higher WS unemployment rate in a more turbulent economic environment is accompanied by considerably longer average unemployment spells. In the most turbulent e n vironment, the average duration of unemployment is 31.8 weeks as compared to the 13.3 weeks in the benchmark case without any turbulence. Moreover, the fractions of long-term unemployed explode in the WS economy. The percentage of currently unemployed workers with spells to date of six months or more rises from 12.6 in the WS economy without turbulence to 63.1 in the WS economy with most economic turbulence. Concerning the percentage of unemployed workers with spells to date of one year or more, the corresponding increase for the WS economy is from 1.3 to 55.6 . In contrast, the small numbers of long-term unemployed in the LF economy stay virtually unchanged in response to increased economic turbulence.
Since economic turbulence is modeled in the form of risk of more skill losses at a moment o f l a y o , it follows that a higher degree of turbulence must be associated with welfare reductions. The LF economy i n T able 5 posts a 8.0 reduction in the discounted expected net consumption of a newborn worker when moving from an environment with no turbulence to the highest degree of turbulence. The corresponding relative w elfare loss in the WS economy is close to twice as large at 15.8 , due to its malfunctioning labor market with excessive unemployment. Despite the dismal performance of the WS economy, the average productivity of employed is comparable to the LF economy for di erent degrees of turbulence. The good productivity record in the WS economy actually re ects the low job nding rate among long-term unemployed workers with depreciated skills.
Finally, when trying to solve for a WS steady state with a variance of :05, a vicious circle develops on the computer. Exploding government expenditures on unemployment compensation chase an exploding unemployment rate without nding a feasible steady state with government budget balance. This breakdown of the computations mirrors a potential instability of a generous welfare state. The feasibility of the system depends critically upon the number of workers that has virtually withdrawn from active labor market y The degree of economic turbulence is indexed by the variance used to compute the distribution of skill losses at lay o s. z Average productivity is computed for the 2-week period.
x The discounted stream of consumption is net of disutility of searching and working.participation because of disincentives. The size of this group can increase dramatically in response to a more turbulent economic environment. As a consequence, a welfare regime that was earlier sustainable under more tranquil economic conditions can suddenly become infeasible, and lead to a mounting budget de cit.
Arti cial Earnings Data
We can use our model as a laboratory for trying to replicate aspects of earnings dynamics described Gottschalk and Mo tt 1994 and Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan 1993, described in section 1. We rst use a comparison of our model under`tranquil' and`turbulent' times to replicate Gottschalk and Mo tt's earnings decompositions across two subperiods.
An equilibrium of our model yields earning dynamics for a distribution of individuals. For given parameter values, an equilibrium of our model produces a stationary probability distribution over the individual state variables, namely, h; w; I and an additional state variable recording whether an individual is employed or unemployed with or without unemployment compensation. We can draw a set of`initial conditions' really individuals from this distribution, then apply the individual equilibrium transition dynamics to construct a panel of individuals' earnings. We can then use arti cial panels for two parameter settings, one with lower turbulence than the other, to prepare versions of Gottschalk and Mo tt's gures. This tells whether our way of modeling increased turbulence generates the observed altered earnings outcomes.
For the laissez-faire economy, w e generated arti cial panels of length nine years with 10,000 individuals for two di erent subperiods; relatively`tranquil' economic times and more`turbulent' times as indexed in Table 5 by v ariances :02 and :04, respectively. The former panel is meant to represent the period 1970-78 in the Gottschalk-Mo tt study, while the latter panel would then correspond to the period 1979-87. For both panels, we use the equilibrium distribution of workers who have been in the labor force for 20 years as initial conditions. A period of 20 years should su ce to remove the initial life cycle pattern in the accumulation of human capital among newborn workers. Recall that, in our calibration, it takes on average seven years and eight months to move from the lowest to the highest skill level for someone who is continuously employed.
Figures 14a and 14b summarize the Gottschalk-Mo tt decomposition for our two arti cial panels, which should be compared with Figures 2a and 2b above. Evidently, a n increase in our turbulence parameter spreads the distributions of both components of the Gottschalk-Mo tt decomposition in the direction observed. However, there are a couple of di erences in terms of the range of the distributions. The fact that our distribution of permanent earnings in Figure 14a spans a smaller range than the Gottschalk-Mo tt data is not surprising. Our arti cial panel contains a group of very homogeneous individuals who are ex ante identical, while the PSID used by Gottschalk and Mo tt comprises a diverse group of American males with di erent educational backgrounds. It is also noteworthy that the increased earnings variability in the more turbulent period in our Figure 14b occurs at lower standard deviations as compared to Gottschalk and Mo tt's ndings. In this respect, the increase in economic turbulence in our parameterization of the 1980's falls short of the changes documented for the U.S. We n o w turn to replicate a version of Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan's 1993 study of income losses experienced by long-tenured displaced workers in the 1980's. Once again, we construct an arti cial panel to compare to Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan's empirical ndings. We study the earnings losses that arise in our model of turbulent times as indexed by v ariance :04 in Table 5 . Using the equilibrium distribution of workers who have been in the labor force for 20 years as initial conditions, we follow 100,000 workers in our model who survive for the next 11 years. Let us call this period`1976-86'. At the end of 1986, a total of 2889 workers have stayed with the same job over the whole period. This reference group is labeled the`stayers', borrowing Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan's terminology, and their earnings are given by the solid line in Figure 15 . In the arti cial panel, 629 workers retain the same job during the rst six years of the period but get laid o in the rst 12 weeks of 1982. At the time of the layo , thesè separators' experience various amounts of instantaneous loss in human capital when their new skill levels are drawn from the dashed distribution in Figure 13 ; skill losses exceeding 10, 20, 30 and 40 are experienced by 298, 157, 71 and 19 workers, respectively. 12 To 12
In our calibration, no one can lose more than 50 of his skills since the highest skill level is 2 while the lowest possible endowed skill level is 1.
reproduce the earnings dynamics in Figure 3 above from Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan's study their Figure 1 , we are led to draw the dashed line in Figure 15 representing the earnings of the worst losers, i.e., the displaced workers experiencing skill losses in excess of 40. The patterns in the data Figure 3 and the arti cial data Figure 15 are the same.
To conclude, the arti cial earnings data implied by our analysis are encouraging for our theoretical approach but discouraging for the viability of current w elfare systems in Europe. The simulations suggest that the mechanism generating high long-term unemployment in our model operates at much l o w er levels of economic turbulence than those observed in the U.S. The analysis therefore raises grave concerns about the sustainability of the generous European unemployment compensation schemes in Table 3 with virtually inde nite duration.
Concluding Discussion
High unemployment rates in the European welfare states have been attributed to many causes such as insiders versus outsiders, adjustment costs in ring and hiring, lack o f w age exibility, shortage of physical capital, mismatch in labor markets, and insu cient demand. All these alternative theories focus on the demand side for labor while largely ignoring the supply side. Our paper takes the opposite approach and only explores the e ects of the welfare state upon the supply of labor. As mentioned in the introduction, explanations based on workers' distorted incentives in the face of generous entitlement programs have been rare in this context, the main reason probably being that empirical work has had di culties in establishing causal relationships between changes in welfare programs and the unemployment rate. Speci cally, the persistent increase in European unemployment since the 1980's does not seem to have been preceded by a n y major welfare reform. Instead, the generosity o f w elfare programs has been increasing steadily over a long period of time without any discrete jump at the time when the unemployment rate rose.
Our analysis suggests that the smooth performance of the welfare states in the 1950's and 1960's concealed an inherent instability in these economies. In our model, a welfare state with a very generous entitlement program is a virtual`time bomb' waiting to explode. So long as the economy is not subject to any major economic shocks, the welfare state can function well. Workers who get laid o with generous unemployment compensation can without too much trouble get back i n to employment a t w orking conditions similar to their previous jobs. That is, the availability of`good jobs' for unemployed workers counteracts the adverse e ects of generous unemployment compensation. However, at the time of a large shock, generous unemployment compensation hinders the process of restructuring the economy. Laid o workers then lack the incentives quickly to accept the transition to new jobs where skills will once again have to be accumulated. Consequently, there can be a lengthy transition phase with long-term unemployment largely attributable to the existence of welfare programs. This causality is hard to detect from time series data because there need not have been any c hanges in the welfare programs at the time of the shock.
Our model of ex ante identical individuals who can only accumulate human capital through work experience is best thought of as a model of blue-collar workers. When joining the labor force, all workers in our model face the same probability of experiencing longterm unemployment during their working life. The workers who end up being unemployed for long terms are ones who have lost considerable amounts of skills at the time of their lay o s and or during their unemployment spells. The fact that welfare bene ts are based on past earnings causes these workers with depreciated skills literally to`bail out' from the active labor force by c hoosing low search i n tensities and high reservation wages. In other words, our model predicts that workers who have accumulated signi cant amounts of skills and subsequently lose these skills are more prone to end up as long-term unemployed. This view is consistent with OECD's 1992a, page 67 observation that f ormer manufacturing workers tend to be over-represented among the long-term unemployed, re ecting the impact of structural adjustment in industry."
Our model bears some interesting connections to aspects of the literature on`duration dependence' and`heterogeneity' as determinants of the observed hazard of leaving unemployment.
13
Our model combines elements of both. Our speci cation makes human 13 An example of a study nding`duration dependence' in unemployment spells is Jackman and Layard 1991. However, it is fair to say that the general evidence for duration-dependence is mixed and controversial. See Heckman and Borjas 1981 for a treatment of the conceptual issues, and for an interpretation of a data set in terms of illusory duration dependence coming from heterogeneity and sample selection bias. 36 capital reside partly in the worker, partly in the`job' or`industry'. Loss of the job-speci c or industry-speci c part see Derek Neal 1995 is captured by the instantaneous capital loss that a separation triggers. The remaining human capital dynamics are attached to the individual, when unemployed; they build in a`duration dependence' for the probability of leaving unemployment. As indicated by our calculations with the model as calibrated for`tranquil' times, the depreciation of skills during spells of unemployment the source of duration dependence is simply too slow t o h a v e m uch a ect on the amount of long-term unemployment. The primary cause of long-term unemployment in our`turbulent' times is the instantaneous loss of skills at layo s. Our probabilistic speci cation of this instantaneous loss creates heterogeneity among laid o workers having the same lost earnings. Since unemployed people with the same past earnings receive identical unemployment compensation, our analysis shows that workers with larger losses of skills tend to choose relatively higher reservation wages per unit of remaining skills and lower search i n tensities. These explain their higher incidence of long-term unemployment.
Our analysis highlights the welfare state's vulnerability in times of economic turbulence. In the last two decades, the rapid restructuring from manufacturing to the service industry, the adoption of new information technologies and the increasing international competition in both goods and services seem to have been major sources of economic turbulence. In the case of internationalization, national economies have found themselves forced to respond to changing economic conditions in farther away places. There seems to be no slowing of the pace of this development. Instead, ongoing market liberalizations in countries such as China, India and the former centrally planned economies in Eastern Europe are accentuating the need for national economies to be exible and responsive t o c hanging international competition. It follows that the welfare states of today w ould bene t from restructuring. In designing social safety nets, it is more important than ever to incorporate incentives to work. 14 Failure to do so threatens to sustain high and long-term unemployment, and needlessly to waste human capital.
